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Along with creating dramatic increases in income and living 
standards, China’s rapid economic growth has had a devastating impact on 
the natural environment. The accompanying processes of industrialization, 
urbanization and increasing consumption have intensified the pressure on 
natural resources, caused severe air and water pollution, and contributed to 
rising levels of acid rain, desertification and land erosion.
Although the central government has been taking various measures to 
fight environmental degradation, such as through increases in funding, 
changes in legislation and support for large-scale environmental protection 
campaigns, its efforts have produced, so far, only modest results. More 
than 80% of China’s coastal water and about 70% of its rivers and lakes are 
polluted with industrial waste, raw sewage and agricultural runoff. 
This Development Viewpoint contends that the core reasons for the lack of 
progress in China are institutional. They relate to the incentive structure of 
local government officials, the relationship between the central government 
and local governments and the limited independence and powers of the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP). 
This Viewpoint focuses on a regional effort to achieve bottom-up 
environmental cooperation in the Pearl River basin in Southern China 
(see Map). Although this innovative effort aims to consolidate joint water-
pollution abatement among 11 provinces, its achievements have been 
hampered by institutional constraints of the Chinese governance system. 
Institutional Structure
China’s government is constructed as a multilevel and territorial hierarchal 
model: the central government in Beijing, together with the headquarters 
of the Communist Party, is the highest level in the command chain. Every 
office has an assigned bureaucratic rank, which determines its decision-
making and bargaining powers. Each government official is appointed 
and promoted by an official higher in the command structure and thus 
accountable mainly to that person. 
It is important to note that provincial governments hold the same 
bureaucratic rank as central ministries. Thus, since they are of similar rank, 
they are unable to compel one another to pursue certain policies. 
Government officials at the regional and local level tend to regard 
producing high economic growth as their main barometer of success, 
and the basis for their promotion. Since environmental protection is 
often seen to conflict with advancing growth, such officials rarely invest 
in environmental projects. Moreover, China’s upward accountability 
governance system also means that public pressure from below is rarely 
successful in obliging local government officials to emphasize protecting 
the environment and safeguarding public health.
Although in the past decade the central government has been channelling 
more investment towards environmental protection, the impact has been 
mitigated at the local level. The Chinese governance structure currently 
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suffers from a ‘principal- agent’ problem. While the central government 
designs national policies, it is not always able to motivate local officials to 
enforce their implementation. 
Policies related to environmental protection do not always receive firm 
backing since the central government is not unified behind them and thus 
sends mixed messages to local governments. Hence, local governments 
choose to implement only those policies that they cannot ignore. In the 
process, they generally choose not to implement costly environmental 
protection policies. An example of this problem is that the compliance with 
the central government requirement for treatment of domestic wastewater is 
less than 20% in most of China’s cities.
The Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) is the body responsible 
for the protection of the natural environment in China. However, it is an 
extremely weak body, which has limited funding and staff. Moreover, it 
received Ministerial-level authority only on March 2008. Most importantly, 
the local branches of the MEP, the Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs), 
depend on local governments for funding. Thus, when local governments 
are not willing to invest in environmental protection, the work of the EPBs is 
severely constrained. 
In addition, China’s process of decentralization has created fierce 
competition among localities for resources, investment and market shares 
of products. Hence, they have great difficulty in managing shared resources. 
In addition, the central government is unable to compel the localities to 
act jointly. Hence, although 86% of the Chinese population reside by and 
depend upon transboundary rivers, such as the Pearl River, there is little 
sustainable management of these water resources. 
Source: Author’s adaptation based on Nikkei Business Publications, 2005
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The Pearl River Basin
A unique case of bottom-up cooperation has been developing in the Pearl 
River Basin since 2004. The basin covers one-fifth of China’s area, contains 
one-third of its population and produces 40% of its GDP. 
Unlike in any other river basin in China, the Environmental Protection 
Bureaus of the 11 provinces and administrative regions sharing the basin 
have joined together to reduce water pollution along the river and improve 
environmental protection practices across the basin. This cooperation was 
initiated by Guangdong province, the main downstream victim of pollution, 
which has been attempting to encourage poorer upstream provinces to 
reduce water pollution. 
The Figure shows pollution levels in the main tributaries of the Pearl River 
Basin. The pollution index (which has been established by the Ministry 
of Water Resources) varies between a) levels I-III, which are suitable for 
agricultural and human use, b) level IV, which is suitable only for some 
industrial use, and c) levels V and ‘poor V’, which are unsuitable for any use. 
The arrows show the direction of the river flow.
The Figure reveals that levels of pollution that render the river water 
unsuitable for any use are significant across many of the provinces, 
especially those downstream such as Guangdong. The Figure also helps 
illustrate why water pollution is a transboundary problem and must be 
addressed jointly by all parties.
Cooperation among the 11 provinces and administrative regions has been 
successful in improving the exchange of experience and information, 
producing joint education and environmental-awareness programs and 
strengthening trust and solidarity among the Environmental Protection 
Bureaus. However, the cooperation has not led to active, concerted steps to 
combat water pollution. 
Such actions are held back by constraints that are caused by the institutional 
framework in which the Environmental Protection Bureaus operate. These 
constraints include:
1. The dependence of Environmental Protection Bureaus on funding by local 
governments; 
2. The unwillingness of local governments of poorer upstream provinces to 
invest in joint efforts to reduce pollution; 
3. The inability of Guangdong to oblige upstream provinces to act because 
of the hierarchical rank structure of the respective governments; 
4. The unwillingness of Guangdong, though a rich province, to bear a heavy 
burden of the costs of regional cooperation; and
5. The efforts of Guangdong as well as other provinces to shift the 
responsibility for funding onto the central government.
Institutional Reforms
Thus, the cooperative efforts in the Pearl River Basin continue without 
producing any substantial abatement of water pollution. However, even 
within the existing hierarchical system, the Chinese government could 
carry out institutional reforms that could strengthen the fight against 
environmental degradation. 
Firstly, evaluating local government officials in terms of their efforts to 
protect the environment would enhance their incentives to invest in 
programs of environmental protection. Currently, there are plans to publish 
measures of ‘Green GDP’ (which discount GDP for environmental losses) in 
parallel to regular GDP figures. However, unless ‘Green GDP’ becomes the 
main reference for the assessment of local officials, they will continue to 
focus on achieving rapid economic growth. 
Secondly, strengthening the independence of the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection and the Environmental Protection Bureaus, through direct 
funding of their operations, would enable them to act independently of 
local governments and help enhance their enforcement of regulations on 
environmental protection across China, regardless of the level of economic 
development in a particular locality or region.  
Finally, the central government could improve the incentives of provinces 
and localities to participate in cooperative mechanisms, such as the one in 
the Pearl River Basin. Strong cooperation platforms would allow quicker and 
more efficient conflict resolution among parties and increase the localities’ 
sense of responsibility for sustainable development in their region. 
The central government could both support the existing cooperation 
platforms and assist in the creation of new platforms. This support could 
include both clearer administrative recognition of such mechanisms and 
financial assistance when it is needed.
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Figure: Water Pollution Level across the Pearl River Basin, 2007
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